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ARTICLES
CENTENNIAL LECTURE TO THE NASSAU
COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
LORD MAKAY OF CLASIFERN 1
I count it a great honour to have been invited by the Nassau
County Bar Association to give this lecture as an important part
of the Centennial celebrations. My subject involves a comparison
between the judicial control of politics in the United States and
the United Kingdom. This is a wide and important subject and
it is appropriate that I should attempt to sketch the framework
involved and that we should have a considerable time for ques-
tions and discussion after I conclude.
I begin with the situation in the United Kingdom. The doc-
1 Lord Makay of Clashfern served as Lord High Chancellor of the United Kingdom,
the highest officer in Great Britain's judicial system, from 1987 to 1997. Lord Makay
was the first member of the Scottish Bar to hold the position of Lord High Chancellor.
As Lord High Chancellor he was simultaneously a member of the cabinet, speaker of the
House of Lords, as well as the highest judicial officer. Lord Makay also had careers as a
mathematician, tax lawyer, and Law Lord.
This is the text of the "Centennial Scholar Lecture" which Lord Makay delivered on
October 15, 1998 at Domes, the home of the Nassau County Bar Association, commemo-
rating NCBA's one-hundreth anniversary.
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trine of the United Kingdom, which has governed this subject
there, is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. As you know
the United Kingdom parliament consists of the House of Com-
mons, whose members are elected so far by a system of first past
the post for constituencies throughout the United Kingdom. The
size of these constituencies is the subject of regular review by the
Parliamentary Boundaries Commission with reports which are
subject to deliberation and decision by parliament. The mem-
bers are elected in a general election when all seats in the House
are subject to election, or at a by-election where a vacancy has
occurred by reason of death or for some other reason a member
ceases to sit as a member of parliament.
The other House of Parliament is the House of Lords consist-
ing of the hereditary peers, certain Bishops of the Church of
England, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and life peers. The
hereditary peers are those who, by reason of a grant, are entitled
to sit in parliament, the grant descending to successors. At pre-
sent the British Government have an election manifesto to de-
prive hereditary peers of their right to sit and vote in the House
of Lords and other changes in that House are contemplated. I
happen personally to be Chairman of a commission set up by the
leader of the Conservative Party to consider options for the re-
form of the Second Chamber. The final element of parliament in
the United Kingdom is the Monarch or Sovereign, Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth II. Acts of parliament generally are the result
of a Bill approved in the same terms by both Houses of Parlia-
ment which then receives the Royal Assent. An act of parlia-
ment is the supreme law in the United Kingdom, and where it
applies, must be given effect. This is the doctrine of the sover-
eignty of parliament. We shall see later some erosion of this
principle in recent times but the principle is historic and well es-
tablished.
The Queen's Printer's copy of an act of parliament determined
the law and the court would not inquire into the manner in
which it had been arrived at. Acts of parliament might be public
general acts creating a general law for the whole of the United
Kingdom, or acts with territorial limitations, such as for example
an act applying to Scotland only but still of a public general
character within that jurisdiction. In other classes of acts are
private acts or personal acts, the former being acts which are
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promoted by a corporation to confer special rights or powers oth-
erwise to legislate in a special way for a particular enterprise
and personal acts which made special laws for particular people.
For example, in former times when divorce was much more diffi-
cult to obtain generally parties to a marriage sometimes peti-
tioned parliament for an act dissolving their marriage. However,
these acts of the legislature were law for the courts and the task
of the court was to construe the act and apply it to the factual
situation before the court.
A qualification in relation to this principle of the supremacy of
parliament arose in connection with acts of the Scottish parlia-
ment before the union of the parliaments. It was possible for an
act of the Scottish parliament to fall into desuetude which re-
sulted in it no longer having the effect of law. This happened
when the act was not enforced over a substantial period and
practice had grown up inconsistent with it. The decision
whether an act of parliament was in desuetude was a decision
for the courts. However, this doctrine did not apply in the par-
liament of England, and since the union of the parliaments it has
not been applied to the parliament of the United Kingdom.
The task of the courts, as I say, in relation to an act of parlia-
ment was to construe the act and apply it to the factual situation
before the court. The acts of the United Kingdom parliament
have normally been expressed, particularly in more recent times,
with a considerable degree of precision, parliament attempting to
lay down the law with sufficient clarity to enable the court to
reach a clear conclusion on the result of its application in any
case, but human language being what it is, and the English lan-
guage in particular being what it is, there is always the possibil-
ity of ambiguity. Much of the work of the courts in relation to
acts of parliament over the years has been deciding whether an
ambiguity in the language exists and if so which of the possible
meanings is the right meaning in the context to give the act and
then to apply that meaning to the factual situation.
However, if the court decided that the act of parliament had a
particular meaning, it would be open to parliament itself, if it
disagreed with that view, to amend the act of parliament and
from the time that amendment took effect, the meaning which
parliament put in the amending statute would prevail. This was
sometimes referred to as parliament over-ruling the court, but in
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strict theory I suppose it is more accurate to say that parliament,
having seen the decision of the court, decided to amend the law
thereafter so that the court's decision no longer applied to a fac-
tual situation the same as that which was the subject of the ear-
lier decision.
One of my particular interests when I was in practice was
taxation law and it was often said that if the taxpayer succeeded
in establishing in court his interpretation of a tax law with the
result that he escaped taxation, it was almost inevitable that in
a very early session of parliament thereafter the law would be
changed to catch a similar transaction so the taxpayer's success
might be short-lived, but perhaps for him that was sufficient.
So far I have been dealing with acts of parliament which may
be conveniently referred to as primary legislation. These acts of-
ten contain a power of a minister of the Crown or some other
authority to make regulations which have the force of law, and if
a regulation is made in accordance with statutory powers by the
authority authorized to do so that provision does have the effect
of law in accordance with its terms. However, in this situation it
is possible to challenge the regulations as not being a proper ex-
ercise of the power given to the minister. The grounds of chal-
lenge can be that, for example, the power granted to the minister
does not extend to regulating the activities that his regulations
have sought to embrace, or that the provisions he has made are
not in accordance with the general purpose of the act, or have
been produced without observance of the procedures which the
act has required to be implemented before a regulation becomes
effective. The most common example of this is where the act
provides for consultation with particular interests before regula-
tions are made. If regulations are then made without this con-
sultation having been properly undertaken the regulation may
be subject to being declared ineffective.
In recent years there has been a large increase in the growth
of regulation-making powers. Lord Chief Justice Hewitt had
protested vigorously against this development referring to it as
"the new desperatism." Since his time there has been a very
considerable growth in the occasions on which the courts have
set aside subordinate legislation for reasons I have indicated.
This could be regarded as a judicial control of politicians but as
will be appreciated the legislature could always overcome a court
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decision by making a new act of parliament, under which the
former regulation would be effective so that even judicial review,
extended as it is, did not give the judges ultimate control over
the legislature, or indeed over subordinate legislation, in the
sense that the legislature could always, by subsequent primary
legislation, give effect to the regulation overturned providing it
with the force of primary law if it so desired. This then is the
traditional doctrine of the supremacy of parliament and it would
be fair to say that so long as it prevailed there was no ultimate
judicial control of politicians.
I should also mention at this stage that by the Bill of Rights,
what politicians said in parliament could not be called into ques-
tion in any court of law and even where remarks made in par-
liament were grossly damaging to an individual's reputation he
had no redress for that in law. So in a sense the absence of judi-
cial control of politicians not only applied to acts of parliament
but also to their actions in parliament.
When the United Kingdom becomes party to a treaty which
requires a change in the law of the United Kingdom, the gov-
ernment before the treaty comes into effect will have an obliga-
tion to have legislation enacted by parliament enabling the
treaty to be fully effective in the United Kingdom, but there is no
scope in these arrangements for judicial intervention ordinarily.
However, after the Second World War the nations of Europe,
having experienced the dreadful night in which human rights
were abused by totalitarian regimes, decided that a new ar-
rangement should be made for the protection of human rights.
The Council of Europe and its accompanying declaration of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms was the response to this
period of European history. The purpose was to create a mecha-
nism by which Europe as a whole would become alerted to
breaches of human rights in any of the countries who were mem-
bers of the Council. The mechanism was an innovation. The ar-
rangements included a commission which considered whether a
complaint that human rights had been abused in a particular
country was admissible. The commission then determined
whether the complaint was justified, and whether the matter
could be referred to the council of ministers in order that the
problem might be amicably resolved. With the country whose
conduct was in question being of course by its minister being a
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party to these discussions. But there was also constituted a
court, The European Court of Human Rights, to which a case
could be brought, either by reference from the commission be-
cause it was important, or by way of challenge to the decision of
the commission. The signatories to the convention obliged them-
selves as a treaty obligation to give effect to the judgments of the
court. The judges of the court were appointed from the member
states, usually the judge for a particular state being a member of
the legal profession of that state with a considerable degree of
standing in it.
This arrangement produced for the United Kingdom a new
type of judicial control of politicians in that if the court decided
that a law in the United Kingdom was inconsistent with the
declaration of human rights and fundamental freedoms, parlia-
ment was obliged to change that law so that the United Kingdom
law might be brought into conformity with the convention. How-
ever, until parliament did so the former law would remain effec-
tive in the United Kingdom although this might produce subse-
quent cases of violation to go before the commission and possibly
the court in Strasbourg.
Further, the court in Strasbourg has always held that in many
of the provisions of the convention there was a degree of discre-
tion accorded to the member states. In other words, the member
states would only be in breach of the convention if what they did
overstepped the boundary in the particular area in question
which observance of human rights required. This, referred to as
the margin of appreciation, meant that in many aspects of the
convention there was a discretion in the member states of how
they might conform with the convention and therefore, when the
court decided that there had been a contravention of the conven-
tion, parliament might well have an option, depending upon the
subject matter, on how it should be implemented.
I give one illustration of a case in which I personally was con-
cerned and which was heard in the court in Strasbourg on the
day when the members of the American Court of Human Rights
first came as such members to visit the court in Strasbourg.
This was a case about the use of corporal punishment in Scottish
schools. It had been traditional in Scotland for children who had
misbehaved to be punished by the teacher by the use of a tawse
which was a leather strap administered on the misbehaving
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child's hands. Two parents whose children had misbehaved ob-
jected to this practice on the ground that they had a religious or
philosophical belief that such action towards a child was wrong.
The court upheld the view that administering corporal punish-
ment to a child of a parent who held the view that it was wrong
was a breach of that parent's right to have their religious and
philosophical views respected in the education of their children.
This provided the possibility to the United Kingdom parliament
that when a child went to school the parent could have an option
to state to the school whether or not they the wished their child
to be subject to corporal punishment. If they did not wish their
child to be subject to corporal punishment the school would re-
spect that. Originally, the government proposed to meet the
Strasbourg decision in this particular way but it became appar-
ent that the difficulties of a fair system of discipline in a class
would be subject to very severe strain if children in the same
class could be subject to such differing sanctions for misbehav-
iour. Accordingly, parliament ultimately decided that the way to
conform with the decision was to abolish corporal punishment in
state schools altogether.
This illustrates the point that although the Strasbourg judges
in a sense exercised a control over the activities of the United
Kingdom parliament, still very considerable options could be left
to the parliament in implementing the parliaments' obligations.
And I suppose it would be right to say that ultimately parlia-
ment could, if it wished, ensure that the government denounce
the treaty and thus remove the obligation on parliament to con-
form with the decisions of the court in Strasbourg which resulted
from it. Thus, in a sense the legislature remained ultimately in
control, although as a practical matter I do not think it at all
likely that such a course would ever be contemplated. So for
practical purposes the Strasbourg control is likely to remain. I
should mention that the system of commission and court to
which I referred as operating in Strasbourg was found with the
growth of work to be ineffective, and these arrangements have
now been altered to make a full-time court the authority for de-
termining complaints of breach of the convention.
When the United Kingdom joined the European Common
Market the United Kingdom came under obligation to secure
that European law laid down under the treaties by the legisla-
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tive processes specified in the treaties, was binding on the
United Kingdom. Decisions on the application of these laws
were committed under the treaties to the European Court of Jus-
tice in Luxembourg. The treaties were given the force of law in
the United Kingdom by the European Communities Act of 1972,
and subsequent amendments of the treaties have been given ef-
fect by subsequent acts. The 1972 Act provided that the laws
enacted under the treaties should be law in the United Kingdom
and that any law which was inconsistent with these laws,
whether passed before or after the 1972 Act, should be ineffec-
tive insofar as it was inconsistent with the European law. A
Provision is made under the treaties for the courts of the mem-
ber states to ascertain the judgment of the European Court of
Justice on any question of European law that arises in a case be-
fore the courts of the member state. The final court of appeal in
any such case is required to submit the question to the Luxem-
bourg court, if it has not previously been done in the case (since
the lower courts considering the matter having a discretion to do
so.) It follows from these arrangements that the court in Lux-
embourg has the right to decide that the provisions of a particu-
lar act of the parliament of the United Kingdom are inconsistent
with the European law. When this comes to the appropriate
court in the United Kingdom, it follows that that court will be
bound to give effect to the judgment of the court in Luxembourg
and set aside as ineffective an act of the parliament of the
United Kingdom. As a corollary, the law of the United Kingdom
must provide the necessary facilities to give any remedy to a liti-
gant which the European law provides for that litigant in respect
of a breach of his rights under that law.
This then is a very direct and strong judicial control of the
legislature of the United Kingdom, lying first in the hands of the
Court of Justice in Luxembourg, but by virtue of that authority
and the obligation of the United Kingdom courts to follow it lying
also in the hands of the judiciary of the United Kingdom. This
novel consequence in the United Kingdom is, I think, evidenced
by the reaction of many when the first instance of its occurrence
became generally known.
Reviewing these developments, I think it can now be said that
there has been a considerable increase in judicial control of poli-
tics in the United Kingdom in recent years. The supremacy of
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parliament in practical terms has been considerably eroded.
From the purely theoretical point of view I think it can still be
said that all of these controls by the judiciary of parliament to
which I have referred are to continue only so long as parliament
does not enact a provision to the contrary. It would theoretically
be possible, as I said, for parliament to enact legislation requir-
ing denunciation of the treaties under which these controls
originate, but as a practical matter I think we can take it that
these innovations are with us to stay. But theoretical possibility
is still important from the point of view of the theory under
which this control takes place.
May I now turn to the United States? Here the historical posi-
tion is very different. The supreme law of the United States, and
I speak of course subject to correction by all of you here who are
more familiar with it than I, is not the law laid down by the leg-
islature but the constitution of the United States.
The courts of the United States, and in particular the Supreme
Court of the United States, have the responsibility of construing
acts of the legislature and applying the meaning they believe to
be the true meaning to the facts of the case before them. Just as
in the United Kingdom, if the legislature concluded on consider-
ing the decision that it was not in accordance with their wishes it
would be open to the legislature to alter the legislation, and once
amended legislation has been enacted it would be the law not-
withstanding the courts' decision to the contrary on the earlier
legislation. In this respect, the courts of the United States stand
in relation to the legislature in the same position as did the
courts traditionally in the United Kingdom.
However, where the court is dealing with the application of the
constitution to the circumstances before it, the courts construc-
tion of the constitution will be definitive and supreme unless and
until the constitution has been altered and that is a very differ-
ent matter from changing state or federal legislation.
I need not remind you that the constitution of the United
States, and its several amendments, is couched in language of
considerable generality, much more general than acts of the leg-
islature, either here or in the United Kingdom, normally are.
Generally speaking, the language was also used some consider-
able time ago. This means that the process of interpretation is a
much less restricted activity in relation to the constitution than
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it would be in relation to the language of at least most, if not all,
acts of parliament.
This appears to me to lead inevitably to the conclusion that the
judicial control of politicians in the United States is much
greater than in the United Kingdom. The powers which United
Kingdom judges have, to which I have referred, are certainly in-
cluded in the powers of the judiciary within the United States.
I think there is no area in which the judges of the United
Kingdom have a greater control over politicians acting as legisla-
tors or as discharging ministerial functions than the judges have
in the United States.
In the present session of the parliament an act has been
passed to alter the arrangements for dealing with human rights,
and the convention to which I have referred has been made part
of the law of the United Kingdom. However, the position is that
the judges are not given authority under that act to set aside the
whole or any part of an act of the United Kingdom parliament.
Rather, they have the authority to make a declaration that an
act or part thereof is inconsistent with the human rights act and
parliament has then a mechanism for speedy resolution of the
matter. Although in theory parliament could differ from the
judges, I anticipate that it is expected that this would not occur.
There are of course in the United States controls over politi-
cians which are wider than their legislative activities because
the most powerful politicians in the United States are not them-
selves members of the legislature. So far as I understand the
only member of the Federal Executive who is a member of the
legislature is the vice-president by virtue of his presidency of the
Senate.
It would I think be appropriate at this stage to comment on
the appointment of judges and the differences on the two sides of
the Atlantic regarding the judicial control of politics to which I
have referred. I will restrict myself to the judges of the highest
courts but the principles apply generally.
For the House of Lords the appointments are made by Her
Majesty The Queen on the recommendation of the Lord Chan-
cellor. Where judges from Scotland are concerned, the Lord
Chancellor would consult the Secretary of State for Scotland.
The selection would be made from judges who have already
served in the High Court and Court of Appeal. In recent years,
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the appointments to the House of Lords have invariably been
made from the Court of Appeal, so far as judges from England,
Wales and Northern Ireland are concerned. In Scotland there is
no separate Court of Appeal and the same distinction does not
apply. In selecting those to be appointed to the House of Lords
the Lord Chancellor will consult with the existing Lords of Ap-
peal in Ordinary and usually also the Lord Chief Justice and the
Master of the Rolls. The search will be for judges who have dis-
tinguished themselves in their previous judicial career. The
qualities looked for are judgment and openness of mind to listen
to argument and to cite the cases, having regard to the argu-
ments, with due respect to the development of the law. Speaking
generally, a judge is promoted for his skill and judgment in ap-
plying the law successfully to the case before him, success being
measured by the cogency of his judgment. It would not be nor-
mal to trawl all the writings of the judge, and many distin-
guished judges have not written a great deal outside the records
of their judgment, to discern the judge's opinions on matters of
public controversy, such as abortion, or politics, private as dis-
tinct from public education and the like. There is no process at
present in which parliament can intervene before an appoint-
ment is concluded. In a recent paper on options for reform of the
second chamber in our parliament, a commission of which I am
chairman, has put forward the possibility that a reformed second
chamber might review proposals for appointment made by the
executive including those for judges, but there is no such mecha-
nism existent at present and there is no present proposal from
government to introduce one. The leader of the opposition re-
marked during the passage of the human rights bill the thought
if judges were to have a wide ranging role in determining mat-
ters of human rights under the European convention, with its
rather general language, then such a procedure might be appro-
priate.
This leads me to the situation here. As I said earlier, where
the judge's task is to construe language of a more general char-
acter than is usually found in statutes of the United Kingdom
parliament,4 there may well be scope for the application of gen-
eral opinions and approach held by the judges prior to being
called upon to decide a particular case. In this country, as you
know, nominations for the Supreme Court are made by the
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President and politics may enter into his nomination, I suppose.
The Judiciary Committee of the American Bar Association re-
ports upon candidates for the judiciary, describing them as not
qualified, as qualified or as well qualified. I assume that the cri-
teria used for this purpose by that committee, and I have had the
advantage of knowing some of the members of it over the years,
are those of professional eminence. Once nominated the judge is
subjected to a process of examination by the judicial committee
of the Senate and here the judge's previous opinions on matters
of possible public controversy may well be examined in consider-
able detail as well as the quality of his judgments, if he has been
a judge, although of course, in this country it is not uncommon
for an academic to be nominated who may not have had previous
judicial experience.
This, I think, could be characterized by saying that the judges
in this country may be appointed for their opinions whereas
judges in our country are appointed for their capacity to form
well reasoned opinions from a position of a reasonably open mind
in the light of the arguments presented to them. This is, of
course, a generalization intended to highlight the distinction
which I am endeavoring to make, although I do not pretend that
it is exhaustive.
A mechanism which has been prominent in the recent history
of the United States is that of independent counsel under the
federal act which provides for the appointment of such an officer.
We do not have in our system anything of a statutory nature re-
sembling your statute for independent counsel. Sofar as I un-
derstand your legislation, it is not so much concerned with the
control of political decisions but rather with the investigation of
allegations of certain types of criminal proceedings by persons
who are subject to the provisions of the act. In our country a
person against whom a prosecutor was making a serious allega-
tion would be suspended from office or would be expected to re-
sign depending upon the circumstance. For example, an allega-
tion against a judge would mean that once it was made he would
be was suspended from office until the matter was determined in
criminal proceedings and if he was a minister of the Crown he
would be invited to resign so that the investigation might pro-
ceed uninhibited by his holding of office.
Fundamentally, the distinction between your country and ours
[Vol. 14:1
1999] CENTENNIAL LECTURE 13
in the matter of judicial control of politics is the difference be-
tween politics controlled by written constitution and politics not
so controlled. The recent developments, however, to which I
have referred in the United Kingdom point to an intermediate
stage in which certain aspects of politics may, to some degree, be
subject to judicial control because that aspect of the legislative
function has been made subject to a law, or laws laid down oth-
erwise than by the legislature. To this extent in recent years our
system has become more like yours.
Are we therefore making progress?

